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1 Introduction
There is an ongoing debate about what are the factors that shape our cities and
determine the use of the land. While theorists in urban economics and economic
geography have developed many interesting models and predictions, causal empirical
evidence is relatively scarce. More specifically, many theories are concerned with the
effect of transport costs on the concentration of individuals and firms within and
between cities, but much of the existing empirics is either descriptive or anecdotal.1
In this paper I provide causal evidence on the effect of an increase in a particular
component of transport costs - commuting costs - on individuals’ location decisions.
I estimate the effect of two reductions in per kilometer tax breaks for commuting
in Germany on employees’ decisions to move house and to switch jobs. Further, I
analyze whether these moves or switches leave employees with a shorter commute and
whether they make them locate their residences or jobs in concentrated locations,
i.e. cities. Theoretical models in urban economics and economic geography are
unanimous in their prediction that higher transport or commuting costs will lead to
increased concentration of economic activity and population. However, these models
are concerned with the long run general equilibrium, while from a public policy point
of view we are also interested in the effect that occurs within a couple of years.
A convincing alternative hypothesis to concentration predicts that higher com-
muting costs will lead to a substantial amount of “re-matching”, which is the process
of occupying existing residential units and jobs differently but not changing their
relative supply or utilization. Assume that some individuals live in location A and
work in B while others work in A and live in B. If commuting costs rise, it becomes
more attractive to live and work in either A or B and some (pairs of) individuals
may now find it optimal to re-match in order to reduce their commuting distance.
A precondition for this hypothesis is that individuals are heterogeneous in their res-
idential preferences and in their productivity in different jobs. I investigate in how
1For a descriptive study, see Bento, Cropper, Mobarak, and Vinha (2005). It has also been
argued that low fuel prices are the main reason for the spread-out shape and the lack of viable
public transport of American cities compared to European ones (Krugman 2008).
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much the response to the tax break changes fits the concentration and in how much
it fits the re-matching hypothesis.
I find that individuals strongly react to higher commuting costs by switching jobs
and moving residence. In my preferred regressions, a 1000 euros reduction in com-
muter tax breaks per year, which amounts to about a 300 euro increase in taxes paid
for the average tax payer, leads to a 2.7 percent increased probability to change job
location on average and it leads to a 1.7 percent increased probability to change resi-
dential location. The probability to change job or residence such that the commuting
distance becomes shorter even rises by 8.9 percent.
In addition, there is evidence for both of the theoretical hypotheses in the data.
Individuals become equally more likely to switch jobs from rural to urban locations
as from urban to rural locations. However, they become more likely to move house
from rural to urban locations but they do not become more likely to move house from
urban to rural locations. Thus, on the one hand, there is no further concentration of
jobs in cities due to the tax break changes. On the other hand, individuals’ residential
moves clearly show signs of an increased population concentration in cities, much as
the standard theory predicts. Yet, the concentration effect for residential moves is
substantially smaller than the re-matching effect.
I also do not find an increase of residential property prices in urban areas, which
suggests that it is not inelastic housing supply or occupation rates that prevent
stronger population concentration, but that the tax break changes’ effect on demand
for urban property is weak in the first place. In addition, a more detailed look at
the dynamics of the adjustment shows that the bulk of the effect happens within two
years after the change in commuting costs. This suggests that the short run effects
considered in this paper may not be too different from the long run effects that the
standard theory is concerned with.
Finally, I calculate the effect of the commuting tax breaks on outcomes that are
directly relevant for policy. Assuming that they only have an effect on journeys
via commuting and abstracting from general equilibrium effects (on fuel prices and
congestion, for example), the tax breaks’ hypothetical complete abolition in 2003/04
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would have led to about a four percent reduction in the overall number of kilometers
traveled in Germany within a year. Due to this, fuel usage would have declined by
5.2 percent and emissions by 3.4 percent while the effect on the movement from rural
locations to cities would have been negligible. Despite the behavioral response of
switching to job-residence combinations that feature a shorter commute, the increase
in the tax base would have been substantial.2 These results are also informative
about the potential effects of reductions in similar commuting subsidies that exist in
several other advanced countries such as the Nordic- and the Low Countries, Austria,
Switzerland, Italy, France, and Japan.
My results contribute to several discussions in policy and academia. First, they
show that an increase in commuting costs leads to increased concentration of popula-
tion in cities, but not of jobs. This relates to the debate about the effect of transport
costs and commuting costs in economic geography and in urban economics, respec-
tively. The results also show that the bulk of the adjustment is re-matching, which
requires substantial individual heterogeneity. This relates to the thriving literature
on local labor markets, an important assumption of which is heterogeneity. Moreover,
I estimate the effect of the commuting tax break change on overall tax revenues, fuel
usage, greenhouse gas emissions, commuting distance, and the depopulation of the
countryside. This relates to the policy debate about the benefits and costs of the
abolition of this subsidy to commuting. Finally, I show that German employees are
on average more mobile in terms of their jobs than in terms of their residences, which
can be interpreted as that they value their private lives more than their careers.
For my analysis I use a representative two percent sample of all German employees
provided by the Federal Employment Agency. This quarterly updated panel features
locational information on residence and employment at the municipality level. I
supplement the information with geocodes for all of the ca 12,500 municipalities in
order to calculate commuting distances for each individual in the sample. I exploit
the fact that tax breaks of commuting were reduced substantially at the turn of
2I refrain from comparing the environmental gains to the welfare losses for workers who lose
part of their commuting subsidies as this would require strong assumptions about the distribution
function of alternative work-residence combinations.
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2003/4 and again in 2006/7 to estimate the effect of an increase in commuting costs
on individuals’ likeliness to switch job location, move residence location, switch such
that the new combination features a shorter commute, and the commuting distance
itself. Moreover, I estimate in how far the switches constitute relocations toward one
of the 80 cities of more than 100,000 inhabitants in the country.
The paper is related to several strands of literature. First, I contribute to the
ongoing debate about the determinants of land use and urban shape. The stan-
dard monocentric urban model (for example, see Brueckner 1987, Fujita 1989) pre-
dicts that higher commuting costs lead to an increased population concentration near
the urban center and to a steeper rent gradient. Classic economic geography shifts
the focus from locational decisions within cities to between cities (for a survey, see
Moretti 2011), while the new economic geography literature has started to explicitly
model transport costs and firms’ locational decisions (e.g. Helpman 1998, Redding
and Sturm 2008). In general, all of these models predict that higher transport or
commuting costs should lead to more concentration in terms of population and of
economic activity (i.e. firms). I provide causal evidence for the existence of this
concentration effect for individuals’ residences, but don’t find evidence for it in terms
of jobs.
Second, the more important component of the adjustment to the tax break changes
is what I call re-matching. This constitutes evidence for substantial individual het-
erogeneity in terms of productivity in different jobs and in terms of preferences for
residential locations. Heterogeneity of workers is an important assumption of the
thriving literature on local labor markets (for example, see the model in Moretti
2011), but it was considered an important feature of realistic theoretical models even
much earlier (e.g. Michel, Perrot, and Thisse 1996).
Third, there is a policy debate about the effect of gasoline, carbon, and public
transport prices on travel demand, CO2 emissions, household location, commuting
choice and economic activity.3 I show that travel distance, CO2 emissions, and loca-
3For example, see Ahlfeldt and Feddersen (2010), Bento, Goulder, Jacobsen, and von Haefen
(2009), Knittel and Sandler (2010), Busse, Knittel, and Zettelmeyer (2009), and Li, von Haefen,
and Timmins (2008). A paper that is methodologically related to mine is by Molloy and Shan
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tional decisions are strongly affected by commuting tax breaks. In general, the tax
break change experiment seems more suited to analyzing the locational impact of a
change in transport or commuting costs than many other experiments: the decline
in the value of a job-residence combination is independent of the chosen transport
mode or of intensive margin responses, such as driving more fuel-efficiently. This
lets me focus on the extensive margin response of moving house or switching job.
Moreover, the tax break changes are arguably fully exogenous to the effect analyzed
- they were decided as part of an across-the-board cut in subsidies due to a dire fiscal
situation - while fuel prices or most public transport investments are endogenous to
travel demand.
Fourth, there is a domestic German debate about the reasons for and against the
abolition of the commuter tax breaks. The claims that such a policy change would
have no effect or only long run effects on peoples’ locational decision (e.g. Distelkamp,
Lutz, Petschow, and Zimmermann 2008, Schulze 2009, Graeb and Vorgrimler 2005)
are closest related to my analysis. I show that individuals do react to the decreases
in commuting tax breaks and that they do it swiftly - to a substantial degree even
before the changes are implemented. Moreover, I estimate their effect on the over-
all reduction in gasoline consumption, emissions, travel distance, and the tax base.
Nonetheless, I make the theoretical argument that the tax breaks, when they are set
at the right level, support efficient matching in the housing and in the labor market.
Environmental and fiscal goals should be pursued using different policy tools, such
as gasoline taxes.4
The fifth group of literature this paper deals with is concerned with job mobility
and the migration decision (most notably, consider Topel and Ward 1992, Bartel
1979). I show that there is a causal effect of pecuniary (i.e. wage) changes for the
current job-residence combination on mobility. Moreover, by observing the strength
of the reaction in terms of moving and in terms of switching jobs, I provide evidence
(2010), who study the effect of gasoline prices on household location via commuting costs. They
find that construction activity reacts strongly to changes in locations’ relative attractiveness due to
increased transport costs but, just as this paper, find no significant effect on house prices.
4Knittel and Sandler (2013) estimate empirically the welfare losses of taxing a variable (commut-
ing in our case) that is imperfectly correlated with an externality and find that they are substantial.
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that the average employee values her residence (and thus her private life) more than
her job.5
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. I explain the data in the next
section. Then I present the theoretical hypotheses about the effect of a reduction
in commuting tax breaks on an individual and an aggregate level as well as the
empirical strategy. Section 4 reports and interprets the main results, and section 5
estimates effects on variables that are of immediate concern for policy makers. Section
6 concludes.
2 Data
2.1 German Employment Records
The data that I use are a two percent representative sample of the quarterly up-
dated administrative records of all German employees, the so-called “BA employment
panel”, collected by the Federal Employment Agency.6 Employers have to provide
quarterly notices about their employees in order for the public administration to de-
termine entitlements to unemployment insurance and the accumulation of retirement
benefits. The information provided should therefore be highly accurate and up to
date.
The data range from 1999 to 2007 with about 500,000 to 600,000 individuals
per year. They include information on each individual’s age, gender, education,
income, and municipality of work and residence. They also include job and employer
characteristics, such as industry sector and size of the employer and the worker’s
position (e.g. in training, regular worker, or foreman). Unfortunately, there is no
information on home ownership, marital status, children, and place of birth provided.
I also don’t know which individuals are occupying a second home near their workplace
5Again, pinning down the rents from existing work places and residences over alternatives that
might feature a shorter commute would require putting a lot of structure on the distribution of these
combinations in the population and I refrain from it in this paper.
6The weighting of observations as in survey data is not necessary as the sample is representative
of the population of German employees and there is no panel attrition in the sense that workers
only disappear when they cease to be employed in actuality.
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from where they travel to work during the week.
Table 1 reports important descriptive statistics on the individuals in the data. A
person stays about seven out of nine years in the dataset on average (so the panel is
quite balanced), she switches job location about 0.9 times and house location about
0.7 times during that period.7 Underlying these averages is substantial heterogeneity
in all the characteristics across individuals as indicated by the reported distribution
quantiles of the variables. Tables 3 and 2 show that there are about 12,500 mu-
nicipalities of residence and 10,500 municipalities of workplace in the dataset. Of
course, the size distribution between municipalities is very dispersed with the biggest
municipalities being many times larger than the smallest ones. Moreover the tables
report the number of connections per work or residence municipality, i.e. the number
of different municipalities from- or to which workers commute, respectively.
I supplement the data by adding detailed geographic coordinates (geocodes) for
each municipality, which I retrieved using Google Maps.8 I use this information to
estimate the commuting distance by car (termed cardistance in the following) for
every individual in the dataset.9 The cardistance is the relevant distance between
residence and workplace because the actual tax breaks are calculated according to
the fastest car distance, although they are granted independent of the actual means
of transport used. Tables 4, 5, and 6 document the distribution of cardistance in
the years 2002, 2004, and 2007. We see that the average cardistance has mostly
been increasing over time, which is also documented in Grau (2009). Therefore, the
identification strategy below will use year fixed effects to control for overall differences
in switching behavior across years.
7Throughout the paper, I use the female form to refer to females and males alike unless I specif-
ically make clear that I’m referring to a female only.
8The geocodes were downloaded on 5 May 2010 from http://www.gpsvisualizer.com/
geocoder/ (last accessed 2013-03-11).
9The cardistance estimate was calculated following Einig and Puetz (2007) who use the crow fly
distance between the midpoints of two municipalities and multiply the result by 1.3. The latter is
the average ratio between car- and crow fly distance. Idiosyncratic mistakes in this approximation
method should not matter given the large number of municipality combinations in the dataset. How-
ever, one may imagine a bias for municipalities of large (area) size and the under- or overestimation
of the commuting distance for some of their residents or workers.
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2.2 Commuter Tax Breaks
Tax breaks for commuting apply in most European countries including Germany.10
As early as 1920, the actual costs of traveling to the workplace were acknowledged
in Germany as income-related expenses and thus could be deducted from the income
tax bill. Initially, only the cost of public transport was accepted, but in 1955 the
federal constitutional court allowed each kilometer traveled by car to be deducted
with 0.50 Deutschmark. From the year 2001 onward, a flat rate irrespective of the
means of transport of 0.36 euros for the first ten kilometers and 0.40 euros thereafter
applied.
Over the years, the reduction (or even the full abolition) of these tax breaks be-
came a constant matter of political debate. The critics, often from the political left
or liberals, argued that the tax breaks are environmentally- and fiscally damaging.
The supporters, often politically conservative or with a mandate from a rural con-
stituency, countered that the tax breaks support rural- and family life, and that they
are enhancing mobility in the labor market because they allow individuals to travel
longer distances to their workplace.
Real change on commuter tax break had to come for another reason—the dire
fiscal situation that the country faced throughout the early 2000s. In September
2003, two powerful state premiers from the big political parties, the conservative
Roland Koch from Hesse and the social democrat Per Steinbrueck from North-Rine
Westphalia, published a joint proposal to cut subsidies across the board in order to
free resources for the government’s budget. The commuter tax breaks were herein
considered as a subsidy and in December an arbitration commission in parliament
decided to reduce them to 0.30 euros per kilometer from the first of January 2004
onward. The second, and larger, reduction of the subsidies came during 2006 when
the two big parties had formed a formal coalition and the government decided to
10The following historical review for Germany is based on http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Entfernungspauschale#cite_note-21, http://www.pendlerrechner.de/geschichte.shtml,
and the database of parliamentary events http://dipbt.bundestag.de/dip21.web/bt (last
accessed 2013-03-11). For international comparisons see Borck and Wrede (2009) and the references
therein.
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abolish the tax breaks starting in 2007 for commutes below 20km. However, on 9
December 2008, the federal constitutional court ruled that this new regulation was an
unequal and inconsistent treatment of citizens before the law and that it was against
the constitution. Hence, the pre-2007 situation was reinstated, but this is beyond the
reach of my dataset, which ends in 2007.
In practice, there have thus been two reductions in the value of a given commute
during my sample period. For individuals who live very close to their workplace this
generally matters less than for individuals who commute long distances, since the tax
break that an individual receives is the oneway cardistance between residence and
workplace times
• 0.36 euros for the first ten kilometers and 0.40 euros thereafter from 1999 to
2003,
• 0.30 euros per kilometer during 2004 to 2006, and
• 0.30 euros per kilometer from kilometer 20 onwards for 2007.
In order to estimate the yearly tax-deductible amount for each worker, I multiply
the resulting amount by 220 workdays per year (Schulze 2009) and divide by 1000 in
order to report the tax breaks in thousands of euros.11
Figure 1 displays the tax breaks enjoyed by the median, the average, the 90, and
the 95 percentile commuter in terms of cardistance over the years. We see that the
tax breaks follow an upward trend in years where there is no policy change, which
reflects the fact that cardistances generally have been increasing as mentioned above.
However, in the years of policy changes, the tax breaks drop, and they drop more the
longer is the cardistance. The strongest and most equally impacting drop happens
11There is a complication about the tax breaks for the years from 1999 to 2001 because these
were determined as a flat rate only for car commuters while commuters on public transport had to
prove the actual incurred cost. For simplicity, I ignore this issue in my calculations. It should not
distort my results too much, since, according to Grau (2009), the majority of commuters are still
using their cars to travel to the workplace and more than three quarters of commuters of distances
above 25km are using their cars—the group that is most affected by the tax break (changes). I also
ignore slightly lower commuter tax breaks before 2001, when the rate for commutes beyond 10km
was 0.36 instead of 0.40 euros.
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in 2007 when tax breaks are only granted above 20km cardistance. For the longer
distance commuters, the overall drop is substantial: the individual at the 95 percentile
experiences an overall reduction in tax breaks of almost 1,500 euros per year.
2.3 Strength of the Experiment
Before moving on to the specific empirical predictions, it is helpful to develop a better
understanding of how important the tax break changes are for different individuals
in the sample and thus the strength of the effects that one could reasonably expect.
This discussion and the analysis in the following will be done in euros of tax break
changes rather than the net income gain that they imply. The reason is that marginal
tax rates depend on workers’ marital status as well as other income components and
deductibles, which are not reported in the data. These problems in determining the
marginal tax rate - in addition to the fact that high-earners may react differently
to the same (relative) change in the net euro value of a job-residence combination
than low-earners - also prevents me from using the difference in the net value of tax
break changes for different earnings groups as additional identifying variation in the
estimation below.
For the determination of the strength of the experiment, I start with the net
effect of a 1000 euros tax break change on an average individual.12 If this person
earns 25,000 euros a year and thus faces a marginal tax rate of 30 percent, the tax
break change reduces her net yearly income by 300 euros or by about 2.5 percent. If
she has a planning horizon of 15 years and discounts the future by five percent, this
amounts to a net present value of the change of about minus 3,300 euros. Thus, the
extents of some very common tax break reductions seem already non-negligible.
In further calculations I consider the extent of the tax break changes in relation
to estimated overall costs of commuting, including the time use, and compared to
the variation in annual fuel costs of commuting. I find that the commuter tax break
changes make up about one ninth of overall commuting costs, while the yearly varia-
12Note that 1000 euros is not excessively high, since all individuals who live more than 20km away
from their workplace in 2006 face a tax breaks reduction of about 1,400 euros.
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tion in gasoline costs is generally a fraction of the net value of the tax break reduction,
in particular for the 2006/07 change.13
Another more important consideration is what fraction of my sample actually
benefits from the tax breaks. In general, any individual who files a tax return can
claim the tax breaks. This should be a very high portion among the individuals
covered by the social security system and thus in the data.14
However, there may be individuals who benefit from the tax breaks but are sys-
tematically not identified in my data as such and vice versa. The former group could
be commuters who live in the same (large) municipality as they work but still travel
a substantial distance to work. In this case, my estimator of the average effect of a
tax break change would be upward biased because I attribute a given overall effect to
a too small treated group. The latter group may be individuals who work part time,
who have a second home near their workplace from which they commute, who do not
earn enough to pay taxes at all, or who do not exceed a general annual allowance
of income related expenses of currently 920 euros.15 The existence of these groups
downward-biases my estimate of the average treatment effect of the tax break change.
3 Theoretical Hypotheses and Empirical Strategy
In this section, I first derive individual-level predictions and then aggregate implica-
tions. The third part presents the empirical strategy.
13For conciseness, I do not report the details of these calculations but they are available upon
request.
14According to the Federal Statistics Office, out of 35.7million employees, 30.3million considered
themselves commuters in 2004.
15http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Werbungskostenpauschbetrag (last accessed 2013-03-11).
Kloas and Kuhfeld (2003) from the German Institute for Economic Research (DIW) provide a
more complete list of such cases and estimate that they constitute about 0.5 percent of total em-
ployment. Also, there is a maximum annual claimable amount of commuter tax breaks (4,500 euros
in December 2010).
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3.1 Micro-Level Predictions
Consider an individual i who currently works at job (location) w and lives at residence
(location) r but who is aware of all the other latent jobs and residences that are
available to her. Assume her utility to be additively separable in money, more exactly,
tax break euros. I can then write
ui(r, w) = vi(r, w) + TB(rw), (1)
where vi(r, w) is the non-tax break component of utility including the disutility of
commuting and the gross tax break TB(wr) is an increasing function of the commut-
ing distance and the tax break rate per kilometer. Clearly, when the tax break rate
per kilometer falls or when tax breaks are abolished for the first 20 kilometers, latent
combinations of work and residence that feature shorter commutes than w and r will
become relatively more attractive.
Note that the components of equation (1) should be interpreted as flows for a
correct utility maximization via choosing the highest ui(r, w): the tax breaks TB(rw)
occur every year that the person lives and works in the work-residence combination
r, w) and accordingly vi(r, w) is the flow utility per year in this combination.
Figure 2 illustrates how the relative attractiveness of combinations changes with
the commuting distance for the specific policy changes of 2003/4 and 2006/7. In the
case of 2003/4, the relative change in tax breaks is higher the larger is the difference
between the two commuting distances. A proportional relationship also holds for the
combinations within 20 kilometers for the 2006/7 change, but thereafter the relative
attractiveness doesn’t change any further. This is because, for example, a commute
of 30 kilometers has lost the same money value as a commute of 50 kilometers.
The valuations of the currently chosen and the latent job-residence combinations
fluctuate all the time for every individual,16 but from figure 2 I would expect them
to fluctuate more when changes in commuting tax breaks occur. The reason is that
these changes add to the “normal” variation in relative valuations by making short
16This is the reason for the turnover in jobs and residences that we observe in the data.
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cardistance combinations relatively more attractive compared to long cardistance
combinations. I would thus expect that individuals are more likely to switch jobs
and/or residence in years where commuting tax breaks fall. Moreover, they are more
likely to switch in a way such that the new cardistance is shorter.
It is also interesting to understand whether individuals are more likely to react
to tax break changes by changing job or by changing residence. On the one hand,
it provides evidence on the causal effect of pecuniary changes for the current job
or residence location on the likeliness to switch job or to move house. This is of
interest in relation to the job mobility and migration literature (see, for example,
Bartel 1979, Topel and Ward 1992) and location-based policies, which have a rationale
if individuals are geographically immobile to a substantial degree (see the discussion
in Moretti 2011). On the other hand, it reveals what the average person values
more: her residence location, and thus a significant part of her private life, or her
job? More precisely, the coefficient on the tax break change in the regressions on
the likeliness to switch jobs or move residence will provide me with the fraction
of individuals for whom the difference in the value of the current job or residence
over the best alternative job or residence is less than a constant (prob(u(w, r) −
u(w′, r) < c) and prob(u(w, r)− u(w, r′)) < c).17 Note that the differences u(w, r)−
u(w′, r) and u(w, r) − u(w, r′) are actually rents. Thus, I can examine whether the
average individual has a higher valuation of her current house or her job over the
best alternative, or, equivalently, whether she is more job- or residentially mobile.
I construct outcome variables to analyze the predictions on the individual level:
four indicators which assume the value of one if, from the previous to the current
year, the individual concerned changes her location of workplace (Work Switch),18 her
location of residence (Residence Switch), either of those (Any Switch), or she switches
such that she ends up with a shorter commute (Closer Switch). Moreover, I construct
17In fact, as I argue below, it provides me with a lower bound on that fraction.
18If I were interested in job mobility without the geographical component, it would be preferable
to examine the effect of the tax break changes on whether individuals change the establishments they
work instead of looking at whether they change their municipality of workplace. I don’t report these
alternative regressions here because I am indeed focusing on the locational impacts. Nonetheless,
the direction of the effect on establishment switches is the same as the ones for the work (location)
switch, though the magnitude is somewhat lower.
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the change in cardistance from the previous to the current year (Cardistance Ch). If
individuals behave like hypothesized in equation (1) and figure 2, and if moving costs
are not prohibitively high compared to the money value of the tax break change,
I would expect that the tax break changes make it more likely that the indicator
variables assume the value of one. Moreover, the average change in cardistance should
turn out more negative.
Table 7 provides the means per worker for the indicator outcome variables in
the year 2002, while tables 4, 5, and 6 describe the distribution of the change in
cardistance in general and conditioning on a change occurring for the years 2002,
2004, and 2007. We see that, per year, almost 14.9% of individuals change their job
location and 12.1% change residence location. Overall, they switch 18.4% of times
while they switch closer only 5.6% of times.1920 Tables 4, 5, and 6 support this last
point, showing that most of the switches are resulting in longer cardistances.
3.2 Macro-Level Predictions
The previous section has shown that, ceteris paribus, the reduction in commuter tax
breaks should make every employee weakly prefer a shorter work-residence combina-
tion. According to standard theory in urban economics and in economic geography,
this shift in aggregate demand for a short commute should lead to increased concen-
tration of population and economic activity.
First, the Alonso-Mills model in the urban economics literature (e.g., see Brueckner
1987, Fujita 1989) focuses on the spatial equilibrium for one city with a central busi-
19These numbers seem quite high and I can only speculate why this is the case. One potential
reason may be mis-recording postcodes for work or residence municipalities in some years which is
corrected in other years and thus increases the measured job and residence turnover. Whatever the
reason, if the upward-bias in measurement of the switches variables is unrelated to the explanatory
variables in the regressions below, this should not be a problem.
20There also seem to be more changes in job- and work locations in 2005 than in other years. I
have searched for explanations for this myself and I enquired about it at the Institute for Employ-
ment Research. I found that in 2005 the distinction between East- and West Berlin was abolished
and thus municipality assignments have changes. Also, there might have been some updating of
employee information from part of employers because there were administrative changes in the pen-
sion insurance system. At this stage, there is no reason for me to believe that these changes should
be systematically and substantially correlated with the tax break changes of individuals.
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ness district in which all firms are exogenously concentrated and around which con-
sumers locate. If commuting costs rise, demand for more central locations of residence
increases, which drives up their relative price and the rent gradient (the ratio between
rents in the urban center and the periphery) becomes steeper. Further, if housing
supply is not completely inelastic, either because of variable lot sizes or the possibility
of construction of new houses, the population density close to the center will increase
(concentration).
Second, classic economic geography a la Rosen-Roback (see Roback 1982, Moretti
2011) shifts the focus from locational decisions within cities to between cities. Again,
there exists a spatial equilibrium in which the marginal consumer-worker is indifferent
between locations. Transport costs, which are the equivalent to commuting costs
in urban economics, are only introduced explicitly in the new economic geography
literature. For example, Helpman (1998) proposes a general equilibrium model in
which different cities are characterized by an exogenously given amenity (i.e. housing
stock), and firms and individuals optimally locate under agglomeration economies
and transport costs. If transport costs increase, the new equilibrium is characterized
by a stronger concentration of individuals and firms in the locations which have more
housing stock. Redding and Sturm (2008) generalize this model by endogenizing the
housing stock, but the concentration implication remains.
Yet, there exists a convincing alternative hypothesis to the concentration predic-
tion on how the adjustment to a rise in commuting costs may look like. Assume
individuals are heterogeneous in terms of their residential preferences and in their
productivity in different jobs. It may then be the case that some of them live in
municipality A and work in B, while others work in A and live in B. If commuting
costs rise, it becomes more attractive to live and work in either A or B and some
(pairs of) individuals who were sufficiently close to indifference initially may now find
it optimal to re-match in order to reduce their commuting distance. I term this the
“re-matching” hypothesis.
A key feature of the re-matching hypothesis is that existing residential units and
jobs are occupied in a different way but their relative supply or utilization is un-
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changed. It also requires sufficient heterogeneity in individuals’ locational prefer-
ences - maybe because they strongly value the place where they grew up - and in job
match quality. This further implies that there exist rents for the current job-residence
match and not every worker-consumer is exactly indifferent between locations or the
distance that she lives from the urban center as in the homogeneous version of the
spatial equilibrium.21
I expect the existence and the relative strength of the concentration and the
re-matching effect to depend on several key factors. First, if housing supply or oc-
cupation rates of the existing housing stock (lot sizes in the terminology of urban
economics) are elastic, many individuals will be able to move to urban centers where
jobs are disproportionately located.22 This leads to a strong effect on population
concentration and we may also see more concentration of jobs in urban centers.23
Second, if housing supply or lot sizes are inelastic, the higher demand for more cen-
tral locations will be absorbed into prices, and property prices in urban areas will rise
while concentration will hardly be affected. In terms of the re-matching hypothesis, I
expect to see a lot of it if jobs are located in diverse municipalities and if individuals
are sufficiently heterogeneous such that there is a lot of scope for re-matching while
not being too heterogeneous such that rents are not unsurpassably high. Finally, the
concentration hypothesis is an implication from long run general equilibrium models,
while the time frame of adjustment that can be considered in this paper is only two
years. Re-matching may be much easier during a short period because, by definition,
it does not need the housing stock or lot sizes to adjust.
I construct variables that take the value of one if an individual changes job or
residence location from a non-urban municipality to one of the 80 cities with more
than 100,000 inhabitants, i.e. Work Switch Urban and Residence Switch Urban, and
21In his survey paper, Moretti (2011) argues that heterogeneity and rents are an economically
important feature of reality and he incorporates them into his generalized spatial equilibrium model.
22Occupation rates may also adjust if there are search frictions in the housing market and thus
there exists a natural rate of vacancies which is affected by the change in demand.
23Employers might however be located in the center already so that no further adjustment on
this margin is possible. Moreover, an employer’s commuting distance minimization problem is much
more complicated than the one of an employee, because the employer has to take into account the
commuting distances of all of her employees.
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the value of minus one if they do the opposite switch, i.e. Work Switch Rural and
Residence Switch Rural.24 If the hypothesized concentration effect is at work in my
dataset, I would expect positive coefficients on the tax break change regressor for the
Work Switch Urban and Residence Switch Urban outcome variables and less positive,
or negative, coefficients on Work Switch Rural and Residence Switch Rural. Table 7
reports that only a small fraction of overall job switches or house moves are switches
from a rural to an urban municipality or vice versa.
3.3 Empirical Strategy
In order to examine the causal impact of changes in tax breaks on individuals’ loca-
tional decisions, and thereby assess the empirical value of the two hypotheses, I run
the following general regression:
location change = β ∗ tax break change+ γ ∗ controls+  (2)
A unit of observation in this regression is an individual in a given year. Location
change on the left hand side of the equation refers to the different outcome variables
defined above, while tax break change refers to the change in tax breaks for an
individual’s work-residence combination.
One important feature that I have to control for in the regression is the cardistance
of last year’s work-residence combination. This is because individuals who have a high
value of commuting distance are generally more likely to change location and the com-
muting distance is mechanically related to the change in tax breaks, since the latter
is calculated using the former. In my main regressions I prefer to be conservative and
to include municipality combination fixed effects to account for this.25 I also include
year fixed effects to account for general differences in the likeliness to change location
between different years. My identification thus relies on a systematically different
24The list of cities with more than 100,000 inhabitants is from Wikipedia http://en.wikipedia.
org/wiki/List_of_cities_in_Germany_with_more_than_100,000_inhabitants (last accessed
2013-03-11).
25This is only possible because my dataset is truly large so that I have enough realized municipality
combinations for statistical inference.
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likeliness to change location for individuals in far-distance municipality combinations
relative to individuals in short-distance municipality combinations around the tax
break change years.
In some of the regressions I even include an interaction of individual fixed effects
together with the municipality fixed effects so that the identification relies solely on
individuals who do move or switch from the respective municipality. This is because
those individuals who don’t change location during the sample period are absorbed by
the individual-municipality-combination fixed effect. Hence, I can separately examine
the tax break changes’ effect on the direction and timing of existing moves.
In order for regression (2) to identify the average treatment effect of the tax break
change on an individidual’s location change,26 the following assumption needs to
hold: There is no other factor than the tax break change that affects the relative like-
liness of location changes for far-distance municipalities compared to short-distance
municipalities over different years. One such factor may be gasoline prices, which I
control for explicitly in the regressions. Other control variables that are less central
for claiming causality of the regression coefficient, but are nonetheless included in the
regression, are dummies for age quartiles, income quartiles, plant size quartiles and
the individual’s position in the job.
One concern for the causal interpretation of the estimates themselves may be
that it is not clear how far in advance individuals expect the tax break changes to
happen. The regression results in the next section show that some of them anticipate
tax break reductions by moving in the preceding year - even before the contemplated
changes were finally decided. However, the optimal response in terms of minimizing
the negative impact is to a first degree independent of the information release about
the policy change: ideally, one would want to move at the 31st of December before
the new rules come into effect. Therefore, the timing of information release should
not constitute a major problem for the causal interpretation of the estimated effects.
26In fact, this is potentially a short run general equilibrium effect because many individuals are
hit by the tax break decrease which may systematically affect fuel prices and wages even in the
short run. For simplicity and because the overall size of changes are not large enough to impose it,
I abstract from general equilibrium effects in this paper.
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Before getting to the presentation of the empirical results, it is important to ex-
plain the construction and the timing of the outcome and the explanatory variables:
In terms of the outcome variables, I consider every individual’s work-residence com-
bination in the fourth quarter of each year and compare it to the combination in the
fourth quarter of last year to calculate the switches and the change in cardistance.
In terms of the regressors, unless a switch took place, I do not know which specific
work-residence combination an individual considered an attractive alternative to the
prevailing work-residence combination last year. Therefore, I cannot calculate the
relative money worth change between the two combinations as a regressor. Instead, I
rely on calculating the change in the tax break worth of last year’s combination that
occurred at the last turn of the year (“TB Ch”) and that occurs at the next turn
of the year (“TB Ch (Next Yr)”) just after the fourth quarter that the observation
refers to. The coefficient on the “TB Ch” regessor captures the effect of the tax
break change last year on location change between last year and this year while the
coefficient on “TB Ch (Next Yr)” captures the effect of the tax break change this
year, i.e. on an anticipatory move. Figure 3 illustrates using a timeline when the
respective regressors may assume values different than zero (they are negative then,
as tax breaks only decline during the sample period).
4 Regression Results
In this section I first present the results from the individual-level regressions and then
discuss their implications in light of the concentration and the re-matching hypothesis.
4.1 Individual-Level Results
I start by estimating regression equation (2) for the likeliness to switch jobs, switch
residence, switch either, and to switch closer using a linear probability model. The
results of my preferred specification with municipality combination fixed effects are
displayed in table 8. The change in gasoline cost for the cardistance this year and
next year as well as dummies for years, age quartiles, income quartiles, plant size
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quartiles, and the individual’s position in the job are included as control variables
throughout. Standard errors are clustered on the municipality combination level.
We see from the table that the tax break change for last year’s cardistance between
this year and last year has a statistically significant and positive effect on the likeliness
to switch or move this year as well as last year. Individuals are also more likely to
switch closer. This is all in accordance with the individual-level predictions from
section 3.1: individuals are supposed to be more likely to move and switch jobs
when tax breaks change and they are more likely to do so in order for the resulting
cardistance to be shorter. They also engage in anticipatory moves and switches in
the sense that some of them switch already in the run up to a tax break change at
the turn of the year.
Moreover, the effect on switching closer in column four is stronger than the overall
effect on switching in column three. This is as one would expect because increases in
commuting costs should encourage switches that lead to a shorter cardistance while
at the same time discouraging switches that lead to a longer cardistance. Thus, when
tax breaks for commuting fall, the number of shortening switches should increase
more than the overall number of switches.27
Next, I examine the magnitude of the effect. A tax break change of 1000 euros -
the net equivalent of this for an average individual is about 300 euros - increases the
likeliness of switching jobs, moving house, switching either, and switching closer by
about 0.4, 0.2, 0.5, and 0.5 percentage points, respectively. Given that the averages
of these variables are 14.9, 12.1, 18.4, and 5.6 percent, a 1000 euros tax break change
increases the likeliness to switch jobs, move house, switch either, and switch closer by
2.7, 1.7, 2.7, and 8.9 percent, respectively. Thus, the effect of the tax break change
is significant statistically and in magnitude, and it is strongest for the likeliness to
switch closer as we should expect.
Tables 9 and 10 rerun the main regressions replacing the municipality combination
27It also suggest that the following general equilibrium effect, though plausible, is not of great em-
pirical importance: some long-cardistance combinations become more attractive (possibly because
of lower rents or house prices) for people who are not affected very much by the tax break change
(possibly because of a low marginal tax rate).
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fixed effects by individuals within municipality combination fixed effects and last
year’s cardistance as the main controls, respectively. The results are quite similar
but somewhat stronger. As mentioned above, in the case of individual municipality
combination fixed effects, the variation exploited only comes from individuals who
do move or switch from the respective municipality. Thus, the tax breaks not only
induce new switches or prevent distance-increasing moves that otherwise would have
happened, but they also influence the direction or the timing of existing switches.
We also see that the coefficient on either work or residence switches is now strictly
smaller than the coefficient on the closer switches. This implies that the tax break
changes prevent or postpone some longer-distance switches on top of encouraging
additional shorter-distance switches.
The effect of changes in fuel prices on switching decisions turns out very inconclu-
sive in the tables. This may not be very surprising. First, individuals continuously
change their expectations about future fuel prices and price changes affect them im-
mediately, contrary to tax break changes. Thus, when new information is revealed,
they may find it optimal to move right away. Such an adjustment process can hardly
be fully captured by the yearly average gasoline price changes included in my regres-
sions. Second, individuals have different margins of adjustment to a gasoline price
change - such as driving less, changing transport mode, or engaging in car sharing -
that are not available in the case of a tax break change and that may be preferred
to moving or switching job. In fact, the recent literature in transport economics and
in environmental economics finds strong effects of gasoline price changes on driving
behavior, new car purchases, and vehicle scrappage decisions (see Li, von Haefen,
and Timmins 2008, Bento, Goulder, Jacobsen, and von Haefen 2009, Knittel and
Sandler 2010).
From table 8 we see that the number of individuals who switch jobs in response
to a tax break change is higher than the number who move residence. As mentioned
above, the likeliness that the average person’s flow valuation of her job over the next
best alternative is below 300 euros (tax breaks of 1000 euros) is about 0.4 percent
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while the corresponding likeliness for her residence is about 0.2 percent.28 Thus, there
are much less individuals who derive a relatively low utility rent from their current
house than there are individuals who derive a relatively low utility rent from their
current job. I interpret this as evidence that the average person values her residence
(location) more than her job (location).
In principle, one could use this information to try to determine the distribution
of- or the average rents from existing work places and residences in the population.
However, this would require strong functional form assumptions and strong assump-
tions about which alternative work-residence combinations individuals are aware of
or, equivalently, the combinations’ arrival rates in a search model. I thus refrain from
such an exercise in this paper.
I conclude from this discussion that the tax break changes for some individuals
are substantial enough to change their preferred job-residence combination and to
raise the utility differential between the old and the new combination above potential
fixed costs of moving house or switching job. Moreover, the direction of the effect
turns out as expected. Finally, the average individual seems much more likely to be
willing to switch jobs rather than to move house in response to a fixed change in the
value of her current combination, which can be interpreted as a higher valuation of
her private life than her job.
4.2 Concentration Versus Re-matching
In order to understand how much of the overall adjustment to the tax break changes
stems from concentration versus re-matching, I need to examine to what extent the
effect leads to rural-to-urban and urban-to-rural moves.
Table 11 reports the results of the regressions that address this question.29 We see
that individuals are significantly more likely to switch their jobs and their residences
28These numbers are strictly lower bounds because in fact only the relative attractiveness of
combinations with a shorter cardistance increases in response to the tax break reduction. Moreover,
the relative attractiveness of combinations that feature a non-zero cardistance does not rise by the
full 300 euros because tax breaks for these combinations themselves fall.
29The results are again similar but somewhat stronger when using individual-municipality com-
bination fixed effects or cardistance as controls instead of municipality combination fixed effects.
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from a rural to an urban location. They are equally likely to switch jobs from an
urban to a rural location whereas the tax break reduction leads to a much weaker
increase in urban-to-rural relocations of residence. Furthermore, the magnitude of
each of the effects is a fraction of the overall adjustment reported in table 8.
The last observation indicates that the re-matching effect in terms of job as well
as residence relocation is much stronger than potential concentration effects. Indeed,
the concentration effect for jobs seems to be non-existent because there are as many
induced urban-to-rural moves as there are rural-to-urban moves. As the overall distri-
bution of jobs between rural and urban locations remains unchanged, these switches
should therefore be considered as rematches. In terms of residential relocations, there
seems to be a concentration effect, since more individuals are induced to move into
cities than are induced to switch in the opposite direction.
What does this imply about the empirical validity of the urban and the economic
geography models in the short run? First of all, jobs do not get more concentrated,
potentially because they are already to a great degree located in urban centers or
because minimizing the overall commuting distance of their employees is simply too
complicated and costly for employers.30 Therefore, the assumption of the vast major-
ity of models that firms are exogenously located in the central business district seems
to be harmless.
A stronger concentration effect on residential switches may be restrained either
because the demand for relocating toward urban areas is not strongly affected by the
tax break changes or because the supply of housing stock and the occupation rates
are not very flexible in cities. According to the standard theory, the latter reason
would imply a substantial increase in the relative price of existing urban housing
stock. I examine this.
Figure 4 plots the relative property price index for big and medium-sized cities
compared to the overall property price index for old and new flats and houses.31
30It seems that the latter explanation might be the more relevant one since we do observe indi-
viduals switch their jobs from urban to rural locations.
31The data were downloaded from the Bank for International Settlements website http://www.
bis.org/statistics/pp.htm on 17 November 2010. Property prices seem to be a better measure
of the effect on the housing market than rental rates because of two reasons. First, rent increases
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There seems to be a general upward trend in the relative price of flats in cities and
a u-shape for houses in cities, but it is hard to see any effect on prices around the
time of the tax break changes, 2003/04 and 2006/07. A set of formal regression
analyses with different specifications in order to account for the time trend also fail
to discover a relationship.32 I abstain from reporting these regressions in the paper
for conciseness.33
Although there may be other reasons why urban versus rural property prices do
not visibly react to the tax break changes,34 the overall message from the results above
seems to be that the relative demand for urban locations is not very strongly affected.
This implies that re-matching is much more important as a channel of adjustment to
increased commuting costs than concentration. It further implies that the assump-
tions underlying the re-matching hypothesis seem to be economically meaningful:
individuals are substantially heterogeneous in terms of their locational preferences as
well as how productive they are in different jobs. Moreover, there exist rents for the
currently occupied job-residence combinations.
So far this analysis has not focused on the dynamics of the adjustment because it
only considers the overall switches in the years before and after the tax break changes
take effect. Yet, it is interesting to understand better how fast people react and in
how much their movements precede or follow the changes. Further, the dynamics
of the adjustment might inform us on the long run effect of changes in commuting
costs or transport costs more generally. Unfortunately, in this data, I cannot analyze
within a short time frame (like one or two years) are restricted by law for privately used properties
in order to protect tenants. Second, property prices should factor in the whole net present value of
the effect, including the short as well as the long run.
32The non-findings of an effect of the tax break changes in property prices are also robust to using
property price indices for big cities instead of big and medium-sized cities and for rural areas instead
of an overall price index.
33Given that I find hardly any effect of the tax break changes on relative property prices, the tiny
effect on moving residence from an urban to a rural location should stem from re-matching: either
because the employer is located in the rural area that the person is moving to, or the rural area is
better connected to the urban area where the employer is located than the previous urban area.
34Foremost, there might be institutional reasons which prevent prices to reflect supply and demand
in the German property market in the short run. For example, rental rate adjustment is very
constrained due to laws that protect (private) tenants from high raises. If property prices reflect
the net present value of rental income, this should dampen the adjustment to a tax break change.
In general, it is a widely held point of view that the German property market is not very free.
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longer time periods than two years, because there is a new policy change coming up
in 2006/07 for the 2003/04 change and the available data end in 2007. Moreover,
even if it were possible to observe a longer time series of the data, it is unclear if this
by itself were much more informative. The reason is because the effects of the tax
break changes might be contaminated by other substantial long run shifts that affect
land use and urban shape.
Therefore, I separate the available time periods into smaller units instead of of
looking at longer horizons. Table 12 reports the regression results for the effect on
the switches for quarters around the tax break changes.35
We see that individuals react already in the first quarter of the year of the change
by moving house or switching jobs indicated by the coefficient on “TB Ch Q1 (Next
Yr)”. The effect then grows until the 5th or 6th quarter (“TB Ch Q1 (Last Yr)”
and “TB Ch Q2 (Last Yr)”) after the tax break change before it drops back to
zero.36 This seems to indicate that most of the adjustment happens in the short term
already. Alternatively, it may simply take very long for housing supply to change,
but the change might be continuous and small in the subsequent periods, so that we
have a strong and visible effect of mostly re-matching and some concentration in the
short term and a continuous and small per quarter effect on concentration via new
housing supply in the medium and the long term. The lack of an effect on property
prices casts doubt on this second explanation, however.37
5 Implications for Public Policy
Up to this point, the discussion has ignored the effect of the tax break reduction on
the average distance commuted. The reason for this neglect was that estimation of
equation (2) with (the change in) cardistance on the left-hand side is in fact biased in
35The results are again similar but somewhat stronger when using individual-municipality com-
bination fixed effects or cardistance as controls instead of municipality combination fixed effects.
36Note that the coefficients for the tax break change last year, i.e. quarters five to eight, are based
solely on the 2003/04 change and might therefore not reflect the average adjustment to both events.
37Yet, Moretti (2011), in his survey paper, quotes studies that find that the adjustment to local
demand shocks take around 10 years.
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panels with a short time dimension and fixed effects (Nickell 1981), and the focus of
the analysis was on the causal identification of the treatment effect of the tax break
change.38
However, in this section I want to focus on the implications that the tax break
change has for policy-relevant variables such as fuel consumption, CO2 emmissions,
and tax payments and revenues. Therefore, I need its effect on the commuting dis-
tance in the first place. Table 13 reports this information. The first column reports
the preferred regression with municipality fixed effects as controls. On average, a one
thousand euro decrease in tax breaks leads to an overall decrease on the commuting
distance of about 0.79 kilometers (summing the coefficients on “TB Ch” and “TB Ch
(Next Yr)”). This is about a decrease of one thirtieth of the average cardistance in
the sample according to tables 4-6.
Compared to column (1) in table 13, the second column distinguishes between the
tax break changes in 2003/4 and those in 2006/7 and the third and fourth column
examine the change in cardistance conditioning on the event that a switch takes place.
We see that the 2006/7 tax break changes seem to have had more than double the
impact on the commuting distance than the 2003/4 tax break changes. Moreover,
conditioning on the event that a switch takes place, the impact on the distance is
(unsurprisingly) very high: a 1,000 euro tax break change makes the switch lead to
a more than four kilometer lower commuting distance.
I want to consider the effect on the commuting distance and fuel usage in three
scenarios of tax break changes: the actual reductions of 2003/4 and 2006/7 as well
as a hypothetical complete abolition of tax breaks in 2003/04. Table 14 lists the
preferred coefficient of 0.79 kilometers lower cardistance for a 1,000 tax break change
together with further information that is used and the respective sources. Using the
average tax break changes of 0.5 thousand euros in 2003/4 and 0.6 thousand euros
in 2006/7 as well as the average overall tax break in 2003 of 2.3 thousand euros, I
arrive at an overall effect of the three scenarios of a decline in the average annual
38Nickell’s result is that in short panels with lagged dependent variables and individual fixed
effects the lagged dependent variables are correlated with the component of the observation’s error
term that is constant over time.
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commute of 0.40, 0.47, and 1.82 kilometers, respectively. This is displayed in the first
row of table 15.39 Using the average number of workdays per year, the fact that the
above distance is just oneway, and the total number of employees, the effect of the
three scenarios of tax break changes on the overall cardistance commuted becomes
6,714, 8,124, and 30,886 million kilometers, respectively. These are 0.98, 1.18, and
4.53 percent of the 690 billion kilometers traveled in the country overall per annum.
In order to compute the estimated fuel savings for the whole economy in terms
of liters and money value, I assume that every commuter goes to work by (gasoline
engine) car by herself. The estimates in the following should thus be interpreted as
an upper bound, since going by car is known to be the most fuel-intensive and CO2
emitting transport mode.40 Using the data on the average fuel consumption and the
fuel price in the respective years from table 14, the amount of fuel saved becomes 537,
626, and 2,471 million liters, and 577, 793, and 2,654 million euros, respectively (see
table 15). Overall, the country-wide fuel usage in the transport sector is 48 billion
liters per year, hence a full abolition of commuter tax breaks in 2003/04 would have
reduced fuel usage in the transport sector by up to 5.2%.
These savings in fuel consumption also have an effect on the emission of greenhouse
gases, notably CO2. Burning one liter of gasoline generates about 2.32 kilogram
of carbon dioxide, hence the tax break changes reduce emissions by an estimated
1.25, 1.45, and 5.73 tonnes. Using data on European Union emission rights trading
between firms, the market would price this at “only” 12.96, 9.36, and 59.62 Mio euros
of environmental savings.41 In terms of overall emissions in passenger traffic, the tax
breaks lead to an emission reduction of 0.74, 0.94, and 3.39 percent, respectively.
While the impact of the tax break change on kilometers traveled, fuel burnt, and
greenhouse gases emitted seems unambiguously positive, its expansionary effect on
39Note that there is no incentive for an “intensive margin” of adjustment (apart from an income
effect), since the tax breaks are independent of transport modes, car sharing, or the actual distance
traveled per journey.
40Yet, note that this assumption is in fact not very extreme since about two thirds of all commuters
use the car (Grau 2009).
41There is widespread criticism claiming that the practice of allocating a large number of emission
rights to firms for free leads to a too low price for the emission rights. Therefore, the above numbers
might severely underestimate the true social benefits from the carbon emissions reduction.
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the tax base may be good news for the exchequer but not for the taxpayer. Using the
respective formulae to calculate the tax breaks before and after the changes in 2003/04
and 2006/07, the first row in table 16 provides the average per person reduction for the
old cardistance, i.e. without taking into account individuals’ reaction to the change.
As individuals switch their workplace and residence closer together, the claimable
tax breaks decrease even further or, to put it from the exchequer’s perspective, the
tax base rises even further. Row two of the table displays this effect.42 Overall, the
tax base per year increases by 21, 26, and 98 billion euros, respectively, helped by
individuals’ behavioral responses of moving residence and job location in order to
reduce commuting distances. This is a substantial amount and assuming that the
average marginal income tax rate is around 30 percent, it provides the government
with additional tax revenues of 6.3, 7.8, and 27 billion euros, respectively.43
Conservative commentators and politicians have argued for a long time that the
commuter tax breaks serve the purpose of supporting and preserving life on the
countryside. Indeed, the results in table 11 show that the tax break changes make
individuals more likely to move from rural areas to urban areas more than they make
them engage in the opposite move. Yet, the concentration effect is only 0.1 percent
per 1000 euros tax break change. Thus, even tax breaks’ hypothetical full abolition
in 2003/04 would have increased the likeliness to move from the countryside to a city
of more than 100,000 inhabitants by just 0.23 percentage points temporarily. This
effect can hardly be termed as “landflight”.
Despite all the positive effects on the environment and travel expenses that the
reduction in tax breaks seemed to have, I cannot make a normative statement whether
it was “beneficial”. In fact there is a sound economic justification for the commuter
tax breaks:
Suppose that one can split up the overall utility u(r, w) from a each job-residence
42In order not to have to deal with the exact distribution of cardistances for the 2006/07 change,
I assume that all the individuals are in fact able to claim positive tax breaks for every kilometer, i.e.
I ignore the 20km with zero tax breaks. Therefore, the estimated effect again should be considered
an upper bound of the true effect.
43In addition to the changing commuting distances, wages might respond to in general equilibrium
which would affect tax revenues. The direction and the extent of such an effect is hard to assess
without putting a lot of specific structure on the problem, however, and from which I refrain.
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match into all other benefits b(r, w) and commuting costs c(r, w). It is then efficient
for every individual to choose
u(r∗, w∗) = b(r∗, w∗)− c(r∗, w∗) = max{u(rj, wk)}
for all j, k. If proportional income taxation is used, in order not to distort the choice
of efficient job-residence matches, the tax rate should be applied to the commuting
costs as well, i.e. (1 − t)[b(r, w) − c(r, w)]. Individuals should thus be allowed to
deduct the exact commuting costs from their gross taxable income. More generally,
in order to preserve efficient matches, proportional income taxation should only be
applied to the “rent” from these matches.
If it is very costly and subject to fraud to have each individual prove their exact
commuting costs to the tax authorities, a tax break that reflects the average costs
per kilometer traveled may be a second best solution to this problem, i.e. TB(rw) =
avg[c(r, w)].44 This is the rationale for the introduction of the commuting tax breaks
in the first place. The full abolition of commuting tax breaks in 2003/04 might
therefore seem attractive from an environmental, travel expenses, and tax revenues
point of view, but it might have distorted efficient matching in the housing and the
labor market.4546
44Although Knittel and Sandler (2013)’s results suggest that using such a proxy is fraught with
error.
45Note that if the individual’s costs c(r, w) do not reflect society’s cost from commuting - which
is likely the case - there is a rationale for bringing c(r, w) to its efficient level trough taxation.
46There exists a crude test whether the original tax breaks were higher than the actual commuting
costs per kilometer: if TB(rw) > avg[c(r, w)], the chosen distances would have been inefficiently
long. Hence, a reduction in tax breaks would increase b(r∗, w∗)− c(r∗, w∗). If we think of b(r∗, w∗)
as mainly the wage and note that −c(r∗, w∗) always increases because of the decreasing commuting
distance, an increasing wage as a response to an increase in tax breaks would constitute evidence
that the tax breaks were too high initially. In unreported regressions I find that there is no clear
effect on wages. Thus there is no strong evidence for too high commuter tax breaks in the first
place.
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6 Conclusion
This paper has shown that individuals switch job or move residence in order to
reduce their commuting distance when the costs of commuting rise. It has also
provided strong evidence that higher commuting costs strengthen forces of population
concentration, which is a core result from standard theory in urban economics and
in economic geography. However, concentration is just a small part of the overall
adjustment in terms of individuals’ residence location and there is no evidence for
job concentration. This is interesting because another margin of adjustment that has
not received much attention in the urban and geography literature seems to account
for the majority of the reaction - namely that individuals change the occupation
of existing jobs and houses to reduce commuting distances. I term this margin of
adjustment “re-matching”.
The analysis has ignored some potentially important factors that were beyond the
scope of the paper. Most importantly, no broadly encompassing general equilibrium
notion of the effects was developed apart from a preliminary analysis of the effect on
relative housing supply and property prices. For example, one could have argued that
the tax break changes and the resulting lower cardistances might also have an effect
on fuel prices and even wage rates, which in turn affects individuals’ location deci-
sions. Moreover, in the theoretical part I focused entirely on the substitution effect
of increases in relative prices whereas the policy change may also have heterogeneous
income effects for every individual in the data.47
Naturally, the question arises whether results from the specific experiment ex-
ploited in this paper can be generalized to other contexts. Germany is a decentralized
and densely populated country.48 The fact that many employees can choose between
jobs in different employment centers may favor the re-matching effect over the concen-
tration effect - compared to centralized countries like France or the United Kingdom.
It may also favor the re-matching effect compared to a large country like the United
47For example, the Fujita (1989) book assumes positive income effects on commuting distance,
i.e. that wealthier households prefer to locate farther away from the urban center.
48When comparing it with other developed countries it also seems to have an efficient public and
private transport infrastructure but an underdeveloped housing market.
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States, where switching employment between different urban areas while residing at
the same place seems less feasible. For cultural and institutional reasons, Germans
are generally less mobile than Americans in the labor market as well as in the housing
market. Therefore, and because of the greater distances involved, one might expect
the overall adjustment to a given change in commuting costs on distances between
home and work to be even larger in the United States than in Germany.
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Figure 1: The Commuter Tax Break Distribution Over the Years
Note.—The figure depicts the median, mean, 90th, and 95th percentile of the tax break distribution
in thousand euros over the sample years.
Figure 2: Tax Break Reductions and the Resulting Changes in the Relative Attrac-
tiveness of Commuting Distances
(a) Policy change in 2003/4 (b) Policy change in 2006/7
Note.—The figures illustrate the decline in the tax breaks by cardistance rw for the 2003/4 (left)
and the 2006/7 (right) change.
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Figure 3: The Timing of the Explanatory Variables
Note.—The figure depicts when the explanatory variables TB Ch and TB Ch (Next Yr) may assume
values different from zero. TB Ch is negative for individuals observed in the fourth quarter of 2004
and 2007 who had work-residence combinations in the fourth quarter of 2003 and 2006, respectively,
that featured a non-zero commuting distance. TB Ch (Next Yr) is negative for individuals observed
in the fourth quarter of 2003 and 2006 who had work-residence combinations in the fourth quarter
of 2002 and 2005, respectively, that featured a non-zero commuting distance.
Figure 4: Relative Property Prices over Time
Note.—The figures depicts the time series of relative price indices for new and old flats (left) and
houses (right) in big and medium cities versus the overall index.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics per Individual
count mean p10 p25 p50 p75 p90
Years in Sample 942746 7.0 2.0 4.0 8.0 10.0 10.0
Work Switch 942746 0.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 3.0
Residence Switch 942746 0.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 2.0
Age (Years) 930122 38.5 20.0 27.0 38.0 48.9 57.5
Female 942746 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 1.0
Monthly Wage (euro) 914878 1703.8 297.0 660.5 1488.4 2475.1 3505.7
Cardistance (km) 911373 28.2 0.0 0.0 9.0 23.7 64.0
Urban Workplace 930122 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.3 1.0 1.0
Urban Residence 925221 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 1.0
Observations 942746
Note.—The table reports means and quantiles for the number of years individuals are in the
sample and the number of work- and residence switches they made during that time (the first
three variables). For the remainder of the variables it reports means and quantiles in the
fourth quarter of each person-year in the sample (1999-2007).
Table 2: Summary of Municipalities by Residence Numbers
count mean p10 p25 p50 p75 p90
Number of Residents 12585 53.6 2.0 4.0 11.0 33.0 92.0
Number of Connections 12585 48.1 2.0 4.0 11.0 33.0 92.0
Observations 12585
Note.—The table summarizes the distribution of the number of residents in the
dataset (i.e. about two percent of the actual number of residents) for municipalities
that report at least one resident in the year 2002. It also provides the distribution
of the number of different employment municipalities in the data that these persons
commute to.
Table 3: Summary of Municipalities by Employment Numbers
count mean p10 p25 p50 p75 p90
Number of Employees 10451 64.5 1.0 2.0 8.0 29.0 92.0
Number of Connections 10451 58.0 1.0 2.0 8.0 28.0 92.0
Observations 10451
Note.—The table summarizes the distribution of the number of employees in the
dataset (i.e. about two percent of the actual number of employees) for munici-
palities that report at least one employee in the year 2002. It also provides the
distribution of the number of different residence municipalities in the data that
these persons commute from.
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Table 4: Summary of Cardistance and Tax Breaks in 2002
count mean p25 p50 p75 p90 p95
Cardistance (Last Year) 545486 25.8 0.0 6.4 19.6 45.4 105.0
Tax Break (Last Year) 545486 2.2 0.0 0.5 1.6 3.9 9.1
Tax Break (Change) 545486 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Cardistance (Change) 516699 -0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 7.0
Cardistance (Change) if Switch 61698 -1.5 -16.8 1.5 18.6 73.1 197.2
Observations 545486
Note.—(Last Year) refers to the fourth quarter of the previous year, i.e. approximately the
beginning of the year considered. (Change) refers to the change during the considered year,
i.e. between the fourth quarter of the previous year and the fourth quarter in the current year.
Cardistances are in kilometers and tax breaks in thousand euros.
Table 5: Summary of Cardistance and Tax Breaks in 2004
count mean p25 p50 p75 p90 p95
Cardistance (Last Year) 544465 26.2 0.0 7.0 20.6 46.5 105.0
Tax Break (Last Year) 544465 2.3 0.0 0.6 1.7 4.0 9.1
Tax Break (Change) 544465 0.5 0.0 0.1 0.4 0.9 2.2
Cardistance (Change) 516456 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.7
Cardistance (Change) if Switch 56299 2.9 -15.9 2.8 20.3 80.2 217.5
Observations 544465
Note.—(Last Year) refers to the fourth quarter of the previous year, i.e. approximately the
beginning of the year considered. (Change) refers to the change during the considered year,
i.e. between the fourth quarter of the previous year and the fourth quarter in the current year.
Cardistances are in kilometers and tax breaks in thousand euros.
Table 6: Summary of Cardistance and Tax Breaks in 2007
count mean p25 p50 p75 p90 p95
Cardistance (Last Year) 552369 27.9 0.0 7.6 21.8 49.9 116.6
Tax Break (Last Year) 552369 1.8 0.0 0.5 1.4 3.3 7.7
Tax Break (Change) 552369 0.6 0.0 0.5 1.3 1.3 1.3
Cardistance (Change) 533305 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 7.4
Cardistance (Change) if Switch 63302 3.0 -18.1 1.6 20.8 86.0 235.3
Observations 552369
Note.—(Last Year) refers to the fourth quarter of the previous year, i.e. approximately the
beginning of the year considered. (Change) refers to the change during the considered year,
i.e. between the fourth quarter of the previous year and the fourth quarter in the current year.
Cardistances are in kilometers and tax breaks in thousand euros.
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Table 7: Summary of Switches in 2002.
count mean
Work Switch 622461 0.149
Residence Switch 622461 0.121
Any Switch 622461 0.184
Closer Switch 516699 0.056
Work Switch Urban 544112 0.014
Work Switch Rural 544112 0.014
Residence Switch Urban 540988 0.008
Residence Switch Rural 540988 0.008
Observations 622461
Table 8: Main Regressions using Municipality Combination Fixed Effects as Controls
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Work Res Work or Res Closer
TB Ch (Next Yr) 0.004∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
TB Ch 0.003∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Petrol Cost Ch (Next Yr) 0.019∗ -0.028∗∗∗ 0.000 0.002
(0.011) (0.005) (0.013) (0.015)
Petrol Cost Ch 0.027∗∗ -0.001 0.032∗∗ 0.033∗∗
(0.011) (0.006) (0.013) (0.014)
Main Control Munic FE Munic FE Munic FE Munic FE
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 4504185 4504185 4504185 4498019
Note.—The table reports regression results of the Work Switch, the Residence Switch, the Any
Switch, and the Closer Switch indicators in columns 1-4, respectively, on tax break changes
that apply to last year’s work-residence combination at the last turn of the year (“TB Ch”)
and the coming turn of the year (“TB Ch (Next Yr)”). Controls are average petrol cost changes
between these years and not reported dummies for age quartiles, income quartiles, plant size
quartiles, and the individual’s position in the job. Moreover, year fixed effects and municipality
combination fixed effects are included. Standard errors in parentheses: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05,
*** p<0.01.
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Table 9: Main Regr. using Individual-Municipality Combination FE as Controls
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Work Res Work or Res Closer
TB Ch (Next Yr) 0.003∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
TB Ch 0.007∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Petrol Cost Ch (Next Yr) -0.047∗∗∗ -0.028∗∗∗ -0.062∗∗∗ -0.046∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.014)
Petrol Cost Ch -0.013∗ -0.009 -0.011 0.004
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.013)
Main Control Mu*Ind FE Mu*Ind FE Mu*Ind FE Mu*Ind FE
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 4504185 4504185 4504185 4498019
Note.—The table reports regression results of the Work Switch, the Residence Switch, the Any
Switch, and the Closer Switch indicators in columns 1-4, respectively, on tax break changes that
apply to last year’s work-residence combination at the last turn of the year (“TB Ch”) and the
coming turn of the year (“TB Ch (Next Yr)”). Controls are average petrol cost changes between
these years and not reported dummies for age quartiles, income quartiles, plant size quartiles, and the
individual’s position in the job. Moreover, year fixed effects and individual-municipality combination
fixed effects are included. Standard errors in parentheses: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
Table 10: Main Regressions using the Cardistance as Control
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Work Res Work or Res Closer
TB Ch (Next Yr) 0.005∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
TB Ch 0.003∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Petrol Cost Ch (Next Yr) 0.016∗∗∗ -0.051∗∗∗ -0.021∗∗∗ -0.031∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
Petrol Cost Ch 0.014∗∗∗ -0.012∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗ 0.006∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002)
Main Control Cardist Cardist Cardist Cardist
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 4504185 4504185 4504185 4498019
Note.—The table reports regression results of theWork Switch, the Residence Switch, the
Any Switch, and the Closer Switch indicators in columns 1-4, respectively, on tax break
changes that apply to last year’s work-residence combination at the last turn of the year
(“TB Ch”) and the coming turn of the year (“TB Ch (Next Yr)”). Controls are average
petrol cost changes between these years and not reported dummies for age quartiles,
income quartiles, plant size quartiles, and the individual’s position in the job. Moreover,
year fixed effects and the cardistance are included. Standard errors in parentheses: *
p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table 11: Urban-Rural Switch Regressions using Municipality-Combination Fixed
Effects as Controls
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Work Urb Work Rur Res Urb Res Rur
TB Ch (Next Yr) 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
TB Ch 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Petrol Cost Ch (Next Yr) 0.002 0.007∗∗ -0.005∗∗∗ -0.005∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001)
Petrol Cost Ch 0.005∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.001 -0.001
(0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001)
Main Control Munic FE Munic FE Munic FE Munic FE
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 4504175 4504175 4502743 4502743
Note.—The table reports regression results of the Work Switch Urban, the Work Switch
Rural, the Residence Switch Urban, and the Residence Switch Rural indicators in columns 1-
4, respectively, on tax break changes that apply to last year’s work-residence combination at
the last turn of the year (“TB Ch”) and the coming turn of the year (“TB Ch (Next Yr)”).
Controls are average petrol cost changes between these years and not reported dummies
for age quartiles, income quartiles, plant size quartiles, and the individual’s position in the
job. Moreover, year fixed effects and municipality combination fixed effects are included.
Standard errors in parentheses: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table 12: Quarterly Regressions using Municipality-Combination Fixed Effects as
Controls
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Work Res Work or Res Closer
TB Ch Q1 (Next Yr) 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
TB Ch Q2 (Next Yr) -0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
TB Ch Q3 (Next Yr) 0.002∗∗∗ 0.000∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
TB Ch Q4 (Next Yr) 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
TB Ch Q1 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
TB Ch Q2 -0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ -0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
TB Ch Q3 0.003∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
TB Ch Q4 0.000∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
TB Ch Q1 (Last Yr) 0.000 0.002∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
TB Ch Q2 (Last Yr) 0.003∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗ 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
TB Ch Q3 (Last Yr) -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
TB Ch Q4 (Last Yr) -0.002∗∗ -0.001 -0.002 -0.001∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
Petrol Cost Ch (Next Yr) 0.002 -0.009∗∗∗ -0.006 -0.003
(0.003) (0.002) (0.005) (0.005)
Petrol Cost Ch 0.005∗ -0.004∗∗∗ 0.001 0.003
(0.003) (0.001) (0.004) (0.004)
Main Control Munic FE Munic FE Munic FE Munic FE
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 18327603 18327603 18327603 18319705
Note.—The table reports regression results of the Work Switch, the Residence Switch, the Any
Switch, and the Closer Switch indicators at a quarterly frequency in columns 1-4, respectively,
on tax break changes that apply to last quarter’s work-residence combination at the last turn
of the year (“TB Ch”), the previous to last turn of the year, and the coming turn of the year
(“TB Ch (Next Yr)”). Controls are average petrol cost changes between the years and not
reported dummies for age quartiles, income quartiles, plant size quartiles, and the individual’s
position in the job. Moreover, year fixed effects and municipality combination fixed effects are
included. Standard errors in parentheses: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table 13: Regr. on Cardistance using Municipality-Combination FE as Controls
(1) (2) (3) (4)
TB Ch (Next Yr) -0.294 -0.236 -4.647∗∗∗ -4.159∗∗∗
(0.206) (0.224) (1.052) (0.970)
TB Ch -0.494∗∗ -0.373∗ -4.472∗∗∗ -4.323∗∗∗
(0.203) (0.222) (0.897) (0.884)
Petrol Cost Ch (Next Yr) 8.861∗∗∗ 8.905∗∗∗ -20.340∗∗ -19.512∗∗
(1.560) (1.554) (9.304) (9.055)
Petrol Cost Ch -0.287 -0.111 -18.950∗∗ -18.088∗∗
(1.431) (1.417) (8.307) (7.944)
TB Ch 0607 (Next Yr) -0.558∗∗ -7.140∗∗∗
(0.242) (2.590)
TB Ch 0607 -1.074∗∗∗ -3.228
(0.245) (2.974)
Main Control Munic FE Munic FE Munic FE Munic FE
Sample Full Full Only Switches Only Switches
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 4498019 4498019 535783 535783
Note.—The table reports regression results of the cardistance on tax break changes that apply to last
year’s work-residence combination at the last turn of the year (“TB Ch”) and the coming turn of the
year (“TB Ch (Next Yr)”). Compared to the first column, the second column distinguishes between
the tax break changes in 2003/4 and those in 2006/7 while the third and fourth column examine the
change in cardistance conditioning on the event that a switch takes place. Controls are as in the
previous tables and standard errors in parentheses: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
Table 14: Information and Sources for the Policy Effect Calculations
Variable 2003/04 2006/07 Source
Employees (in mio) 38.63 39.00 destatis.de
Workdays per year 220 220 Schulze (2009)
Avg fuel usage (liters per km) 0.080 0.077 autopresse.de
Fuel price (euro per liter, yearly average) 1.07 1.27 mwv.de
CO2 emissions (in kg per liter of petrol) 2.32 2.32 de.wikipedia.org
CO2 price (in euro per tonne) 10.40 6.45 eex.com
Overall CO2 emissions (in mio tonnes p.a.) 889 867 umweltbundesamt.de
Fraction of CO2 emission in traffic 0.19 0.18 umweltbundesamt.de
Overall fuel usage in traffic (bio liters p.a.) 48 47 umweltbundesamt.de
Overall person road travel (bio km p.a.) 682 687 umweltbundesamt.de
Avg cardist 26.20 27.90 iab data
Tax break rate before 0.40 0.30 iab data
Tax break rate after (<20km) 0.30 0.00 iab data
Tax break rate after (>20km) 0.30 0.30 iab data
Avg tax break (tsd euro p.a.) 2.30 1.80 iab data
Avg tax break change (tsd euro p.a.) -0.50 -0.60 iab data
Estimated effect of tax break change on cardist (in km) 0.79 0.79 iab data
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Table 15: Estimated Effect on Cardistance, Fuel Usage, and CO2 Emissions
2003/04 2006/07 full abolition
p.p. cardistance reduction (in km) 0.40 0.47 1.82
Reduction overall distance (mio km) 6,714 8,124 30,886
Reduction overall distance (in % of person road travel) 0.98 1.18 4.53
Fuel savings (in mio liters) 537 626 2,471
Fuel cost savings (in mio euro) 577 793 2,654
Fuel savings (in % of fuel usage) 1.12 1.33 5.15
CO2 emissions reduction (in mio tonnes) 1.25 1.45 5.73
CO2 emissions reduction (in mio euro) 12.96 9.36 59.62
CO2 emissions reduction (in % of traffic emissions) 0.74 0.94 3.39
Table 16: Estimated Effect on the Tax Base
2003/04 2006/07 full abolition
Avg tax break reduction for original cardist (tsd euro p.a.) 0.50 0.60 2.30
Tax break reduction due to cardist change (tsd euro p.a.) 0.052 0.062 0.240
Overall increase in tax base (bio euro p.a.) 21 26 98
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